Consigliere:

First, please note, what words mean is not at all important. Scientists have recognized this for centuries. When it comes to defining words, they simply get a bunch of people together and say, “From now on, we will use these definitions.” Then the rest of the scientific community says, “Okay,” and off they go.

So, for example, the International Astronomical Union is currently trying to decide how to define the word ‘planet’—in order to determine if Pluto is or is not a planet. Whatever decision they reach will be the arbitrary decision of a group of people.

Yet, there is nothing in this activity that threatens the objectivity of science in the least. Scientists have long recognized that what words mean is not important. All that matters is that they are used consistently. So, they have quit wasting their time discussing the meanings of words and left that job to the arbitrary decision of committees. Meanwhile, they spend their time studying what is true of the universe.

I am fully comfortable with using words the way that scientists use words. On this model, I invite anybody to give me whatever set of meanings they would like me to use. Changing the meanings of words is nothing more than changing the language that a person is speaking. I can translate this theory into any language you want, and the theory will not change.

Imagine a bunch of scientists getting together and asking, “Who gets to decide what the word ‘planet’ means?”

Scientists reconize that the answer to this question is, “Who the frack cares? Pick somebody. It does not matter. It does not affect the objective truth of claims made in the field of astronomy in the slightest. It only affects the language we use when we report those claims.”

The astronomer’s answer to the question, “Who gets to decide what the word ‘planet’ means” is the same as my answer to the question, “Who gets to decide what ‘good’ means?” If you think that this is an important question, you do not understand the nature of language.

Now, the desire to torture children is disqualified because the desire to torture children inherently thwarts other desires. It is quite obvious that the desire to torture children cannot be fulfilled unless some other desire—the child’s desire to be free from pain—is being thwarted. In all cases, either the child’s desire to be free of pain is being thwarted, or the desire to torture children is being thwarted. Either way, there is a desire being thwarted. If “good” = “is such as to fulfill desires”, and the desire to torture children is inherently desire-thwarting, then the desire to torture children cannot be good.

On the other hand, you can have a whole society without a desire to torture children with no desire-thwarting. If nobody had a desire to torture children, then no person would be driven by such a desire to thwart the desire of children to be free of pain. Furthermore, there will be no person whose desire to torture children would be thwarted, because no person with a desire to torture children would exist.

Similarly, the desire to help children is inhrently desire-fulfilling. It fulfills the desires of the children being helped. Because a desire to help children is desire-fulfilling, it is good.

Of these two possibilities, only the second allows for the possibility that only desire-fulfillment takes place, and that there is no desire thwarting. By this, we see that the desire to torture children is inherently desire-thwarting. The desire to torture children is not “such as to fulfill (other) desires.” It does not fulfill any other desires—it only thwarts other desires.

From this, the principle, “Do that act that is consistent with the best desires,â€? where the desire to help children is good and the desire to torture children is bad, says to help children and not to torture children.

Beware, Alonzo: Consi tends to be a stickler for words and their contextual uses.

No harm was intended on Consi’s behalf in the making of this comment.

Now, the desire to torture children is disqualified because the desire to torture children inherently thwarts other desires. It is quite obvious that the desire to torture children cannot be fulfilled unless some other desire—the child’s desire to be free from pain—is being thwarted.

My rough understanding is tht the desire fulfillment must be consonant with the desires of others or at least not be at odds with the desires of others.  If you use the cake analogy, under your system the cake never gets made.

Similarly, the desire to help children is inhrently desire-fulfilling. It fulfills the desires of the children being helped. Because a desire to help children is desire-fulfilling, it is good.

Conversely, in helping the children you have thwarted the desire-fulfillment of those who would like to torture children.  I’ve kinda slow, but I don’t see the difference there if the distinction is being drawn on whether doing something is desire thwarting. That’s why there is no cake.

So why the standard objection to the “imposition of the majority’s mores upon the minority� if the goal is cake that makes the most happy?

Indeed, consi.  But one of the hallmarks of all society is precisely “the imposition of the majority’s mores upon the minority.” The details of how this is handled make up a large part of the difference between different religions and governments.

My father always said, your freedom to swing your arm ends at my nose.  Sounds pretty simple.  But where does my nose start- at the point where I can smell your smelly cigar?  There is no system of thought, be it a philosophy such as utilitarianism, a religion such as Christianity, or a form of government such as democracy, that can “objectively” tell us exactly what we “ought” to do, or exactly define “good”.  The scare quotes indicate my belief that as far as morals go, “objectivity”, “ought”, and “good” are evolved structures, and cannot be deduced from “is”.  Of course, being social animals, we have many desires and feelings in common- most people want to be free of pain and fear, well fed, etc.  Otherwise we could have no societies at all.  But evolution, first biological, and then cultural, has left us with a multitude of conflicting desires, whose resolution will always be problematic.

Breaking thread (only barely) for just a second, has anyone else ever read Eric Frank Russell’s science fiction work ‘And Then There Were None’? Care to examine it and then introduce comments here about whether or not it contains any useful ideas concerning the thread?

One source for E. F. Russell’s text online

Hi Alonzo,

Well, I have to give you credit - desire utilitarianism seems like the most agreeable form of utilitarianism that I have come across. Act utilitarianism has too many disagreeable consequences. And rule utilitarianism has always struck me as a way to wave the white flag on one hand, while claiming not to have surrendered on the other.

At least at first glance, desire utilitarianism seems to avoid both problems.

I am not saying that desire fulfillment is good. I say, ‘good’ = ‘is such as to fulfill the desires in question.’ These are not the same thing.

In that case I think the choice of the word ‘good’ is misleading. As you point out, language is an agreed upon convention and most of us already have a different sense of the meaning of good. Perhaps we can use a different word.

doog = is such as to fulfill the desires in question

The question is: is doog objectively good? If so, where does this objective good come from? If not, then why doog? Why not something else?

As I wrote above, astronomy is a hard science—as ‘objective’ as any science can be. Yet, astronomers are not sweating about whether the International Astronomical Union is going to come up with “the right definition” of the word “planet.” They know full well that, whatever definition the IAU comes up with will be the subjective opinion of a bunch of men sitting around the table, and not one of them will be able to defend their vote as the objectively right definition of the word “planet.” Yet, they do not care, and they do not treat this as a threat to the objectivity of astronomy.

The reason for this is that they respect the fact that words do not have the power to change things. Regardless of whether Pluto ends up being a planet or not, its orbit will not change. Its distance from the sun will not change. Its chemical composition, size, the number of moons it has, and the layout and size of its craters will not change. Nothing that is objectively true of Pluto will be affected by what we call it. Therefore, the scientists say, as far as the science goes, ‘call it whatever you want.’

Many people who talk about value theory, however, treat the word ‘good’ like a magic wand that somehow changes whatever it touches. Attach the word ‘good’ to ‘happiness’, and now suddenly ‘happiness’ changes so that it becomes something that it would not become if we called it something else. These people then ask the question, ‘What entity—happiness? desire fulfillment? survival?—deserves the magic property that we can bestow upon it by calling it ‘good’?”

Indeed, when I say that ‘good’ = ‘is such as to fulfill the desires in question,’ the first question I get asked is, ‘What special reason can you give us to explain why ‘desire fulfillment’ deserves the special power that you assign to it by calling it ‘good’—a power that it would not have if you were to call it something else?’

My answer: If you are treating words as entities that change what they refer to, then you are starting off with a bad assumption. With such a bad start, I fully expect your arguments and debate to go absolutely nowhere.

You can define ‘good’ in terms of ‘happiness’ if you like. It will not change what is objectively true about happiness. When I assign ‘good’ to ‘is such as to fulfill the desires in question,’ I am saying nothing about ‘being such as to fulfill the desires in question’ that would not objectively true of that state under any other name. Which is why I say that I do not care about definitions. I care only about what is objectively true of ‘being such as to fulfill the desires in question.’

I could define ‘good’ as ‘a chemical compound consisting of one part oxygen and two parts hydrogen’. It’s a perfectly good definition. However, I would have trouble linking ‘good’ defined this way to reasons for action.

You can assign ‘good’ to ‘happiness’ if you want, but you will have trouble linking it to reasons for action.

Consider this hypothetical choice:

You and somebody that you care about—child, parent, significant other—are captured by a mad scientist. You are given the following choice:

(1) This other person will be taken and tortured mercilessly. However, you will be made to believe that he is living a healthy and happy life.

(2) This other person will be set free to live, given free medical care and enough money to live comfortably, but you will be made to believe that he is being tortured mercilessly.

‘Happiness’ theory predicts that everybody will pick 1. ‘Happiness’ theory will fail—many people will pick 2.

‘Desire fulfillment’ says that a person will choose that option that will make true the propositioins that are the objects of his desire. The person for whom the desire that this other person is healthy and happy is stronger than the desire for happiness will pick (2). The person with a stronger desire for happiness than for the health and happiness of this other person will pick (1).

‘Desire fulfillment,’ then, has a link to reasons for action (reasons for choices) that ‘happiness’ does not have. You can define ‘good’ in terms of ‘happiness’ if you want. However, you would have to give up its link to reasons for action. If you want to link ‘good’ to reasons for action, only ‘desire fulfillment’ has that link. Make your choice. Do you want ‘good’ to refer to something that has a link to reasons for action or not?

I am still not saying anything about ‘desire fulfillment’ that is not objectively true of ‘desire fulfillment’—including its link to reasons for action.

My objection to a sharp break between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is that it requires metaphysical dualism—and metaphysical dualism is extremely problematic.If ‘ought’ is distinct from ‘is’, then how does ‘ought’ influence things in the real world? Do physicists find a set of events in the real world that cannot be explained but through the influence of these ‘ought’ entities—the perceptions of which cause atoms to move left or right?

Zilch is right—our desires have been subject to evolutionary and cultural forces. The link between desires and the ‘is’ world is well established. Desires are codes written into the brain. Brains are connected to muscles through nerves. Evolution has molded our disposition to different brain strucures—selecting a tendency towards acquiring those desires that promote our genetic survival.

However, brain structure is maleable given interaction with the environment. That is how we learn. The proposition that our beliefs can be molded by interaction with the environment is beyond dispute. Clearly, our desires can be molded (within limts) by interaction with the environment as well.

If ‘ought’ is linked to desires, we have both a link to reasons for action and a physical link between ought and the real world that explains its interaction. If ‘ought’ is linked to something separate and distinct from the real world, then what is it, and how does it interact with the real world?

‘Should’ (or ‘ought’) = ‘would fulfill the desires in question’ links to reasons for action and explains the relationship between reasons for action and desires.

Whenever a person uses the terms ‘should’ or ‘ought’, he is making a claim that certain reasons for action exist. If those reasons for action do not exist in fact—if they are not real—then we can rightfully answer that person by saying, ‘No. The reasons for action that you are talking about are not real, so your claim that I ‘should’ or ‘ought to’ do that which you claim is false.’”

‘Is such as to fulfill the desires in question’ are reasons for action that are real.

Alonzo,

I appreciate your time here.  I’m not sure how the IAU actually relates to my assessement of what you are saying.  So a couple of real quick questions that can be answered without paragraphs:

1) Did I correctly summarize what you were setting forth in my post on 4/6/06 at 11:03 P.M.?

2) If not, how is the assessment inaccurate?

3) If so, then is it agreed that helping children is desire thwarting for those that want to torture children?

4) If 3 is accurate, then the distinction you have drawn is an illusory one, correct?

4) What on earth do you have against cake? Is using a cake analogy desire thwarting for you?

1) Did I correctly summarize what you were setting forth in my post on 4/6/06 at 11:03 P.M.?

No.

2) If not, how is the assessment inaccurate?

You wrote: “My rough understanding is tht the desire fulfillment must be consonant with the desires of others or at least not be at odds with the desires of others.”

A good desire is one that tends to fulfill other desires. It can thwart other desires, but the tendency must be positive.

The desire that wrongdoers be punished certainly thwarts desires—namely, those of the wrongdoers who are punished.

However, this desire that wrongdoers be punished tends to result both in fewer wrongdoers, and in fewer victims of wrongdoing. In both ways, the desire that wrongdoers be punished results in overall desire fulfillment.

Once again, I remind you that I am talking about the affects of desires, rather than the effects of actions. Counter-examples that show how a certain desire-fulfilling act is still wrong are not relevant here. A relevant counter-example has to show how a desire that tends—overall, all things considered—to thwart, rather than fulfill, other desires can be counted as good.

Imagine that you are sitting in front of a control board with dials for all of society’s desires on it.

You take the dial for “desire to torture children.” If you turn this up, then overall desire fulfillment decreases. Either the person with a desire to torture children must have that desire thwarted, or the child’s aversion to pain must be thwarted. On the other hand, if you turn it down, overall desire thwarting goes down.

Now, take the dial for “aversion to the desire to torture children.” This dial is linked to the “desire to torture children” dial. Increasing the aversion to the desire to torture children results in lowering the overall desire to torture children. Condemnation and punishment of that desire makes it less common, as more people acquire society’s standard against torturing children. At the same time, decreasing the aversion to torturing children allows the desire to torture children to increase, with all of the desire-thwarting that results.

So, we have reason to turn down the “desire to torture children” dial, and we do that by turning up the “aversion to the desire to torture children” dial.

Yes, some desire-thwarting still results—but we get less desire thwarting by turning this aversion to child torture up than we get by turning this aversion to child torture down.

3) If so, then is it agreed that helping children is desire thwarting for those that want to torture children?

Not applicable.

4) If 3 is accurate, then the distinction you have drawn is an illusory one, correct?

Not applicable

5) What on earth do you have against cake? Is using a cake analogy desire thwarting for you?

The cake analogy examines an act. I have said that this is not an act-utilitarian theory. It is a rule-utilitarian theory (substituting desires for rules).

Just jumping in for a moment to state my appreciation for Alonzo taking the time to come here and explain his ideas for us. I don’t know about everyone else, but my understanding of his theory is a lot clearer now.

I’d also like to take a moment to thank everyone who has participated in the discussion for asking thoughtful and useful questions about it. This has turned into a really good thread.

You can define ‘good’ in terms of ‘happiness’ if you like. It will not change what is objectively true about happiness. When I assign ‘good’ to ‘is such as to fulfill the desires in question,’ I am saying nothing about ‘being such as to fulfill the desires in question’ that would not objectively true of that state under any other name. Which is why I say that I do not care about definitions. I care only about what is objectively true of ‘being such as to fulfill the desires in question.’

Exactly. The only good is what you define.

‘Desire fulfillment,’ then, has a link to reasons for action (reasons for choices) that ‘happiness’ does not have. You can define ‘good’ in terms of ‘happiness’ if you want. However, you would have to give up its link to reasons for action. If you want to link ‘good’ to reasons for action, only ‘desire fulfillment’ has that link. Make your choice. Do you want ‘good’ to refer to something that has a link to reasons for action or not?

Desire fulfillment does not always have a link to actions. What if our aliens made us this offer: We will rob a bank for a million dollars and give it to you. We will also use our alien technology to make sure that you do not get caught.

Why should I be the nice guy and refuse the alien’s offer?

My objection to a sharp break between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is that it requires metaphysical dualism—and metaphysical dualism is extremely problematic.If ‘ought’ is distinct from ‘is’, then how does ‘ought’ influence things in the real world? Do physicists find a set of events in the real world that cannot be explained but through the influence of these ‘ought’ entities—the perceptions of which cause atoms to move left or right?

I agree. ‘Ought’ does not make sense. The only rational position for an atheist to take is what Zilch and I were discussing: the realization that cooperation is usually the best policy for a social animal. But it isn’t always, and then the only rational position is not to cooperate.

I’d also like to add my thanks to Alonzo for an interesting discussion.

Kysstfafm- I took a look at your link to Russell’s story, and it reminded me of the time I was trying to call a friend in the Linguistics Dept. at Cal Berkeley:

Me: Hello, may I speak to John Davis, please?
Linguist: Yes.
Pause.
Me:  Could you call him to the phone, please?
Linguist:  Yes.
Pause.
Me: (finally catching on) Do so.  Please.
Linguist (aside) Hey, John, you got a call…

Justin:  I agree that we agree to some extent, but I think you may have misunderstood my position, which is that there is no perfectly rational system of morals, because of built-in conflicts that cannot be eliminated.  While evolution can tell us a lot about how we came to be the way we are, it cannot be an objective basis for morals, because our evolved desires conflict with one another, and because we also desire things evolution has not, or has only sketchily, prepared us for: culturally learned beliefs and desires, as Alonzo mentioned.

True, an atheist cannot be objectively moral- but neither can a believer, for two reasons.  One has been mentioned already by Les: the impossibility of knowing exactly what God wants us to do.  If I recall correctly, there have occasionally been some disagreements between religions, and even within religions, on this point.  The other reason that a believer cannot be objectively moral is that the source of objective morals, God, does not exist.

Not a very good linguist, Zilch.  MAY (as oppossed to CAN) is generally taken as having the semantics meaning ‘please do this’.

Hussar, what exactly do you mean by “good”?  I don’t know how successful he was at passing on his genes…

True, an atheist cannot be objectively moral- but neither can a believer, for two reasons.  One has been mentioned already by Les: the impossibility of knowing exactly what God wants us to do.  If I recall correctly, there have occasionally been some disagreements between religions, and even within religions, on this point.  The other reason that a believer cannot be objectively moral is that the source of objective morals, God, does not exist.

It is not theoretically impossible for us to know what God wants us to do.  Neither is the existence of God a theoretical impossibility. 

If we can engage in the abstract to the extent that we have in this thread, abhorring something as wonderful as cake, then we can’t be just discarding God or discernment of God’s will with a few rash keystrokes. :p

It is not theoretically impossible for us to know what God wants us to do.  Neither is the existence of God a theoretical impossibility.

Well, consi, I guess it depends on what theory you go by.  Let’s just say that believers have not made a convincing case so far for knowing what God wants us to do, or that God exists at all.

I agree with you, however, about cake being wonderful.  Any system of thought that claims otherwise is obviously on the wrong track.

Alonzo,

Just a quick question how does one desire effect other desires except through influencing actions.  For example, if I had the desire to light babies on fire how does that desire simpliciter thwart the desires of babies or their parents unless I actually act upon that desire?

I don’t see how desire alone could be construed as “immoral” or bad unless it is acted upon. For example, Bob can desire all day long to burn his neighbor’s house down, but unless Bob actually does commit an act of arson on his neighbor’s home, the desire itself is not immoral (though it may reveal something about Bob’s mental health).

If you wanted to light babies on fire, but didn’t, then aren’t your own desires being thwarted?

Are we talking “utter need” desires (what you truly don’t think that you can live without doing) or merely “idle wish” desires (and the whole continuum in between), because I’m not certain desire really is any better a concept than good/evil for the purposes of this discussion. I know people who are total bullshit about their desires because they cannot be pure in their thinking about what they want. Alot of thoughts can grow through your mind when contemplating a course of action, many of them can be viewed as desires.

Adding to what Kryss said, there certainly exist degrees of desire. While I desire a brand new Rolls Royce, my desire for a friend’s love and support outweighs my desire for a new car (sometimes ).

Sorry for my typo earlier (go rather than grow) and thanks Sadie. On the same page there are those who don’t seem to have much between thought and deed and others that never seem to achieve the level of deed for all of the many thoughts that go through their heads.

Where do you stand on fantasy (as opposed to desires - I don’t think that they are 100% equivalent)? There are even many kinds of fantasies, with people not seriously expecting that they will ever achieve actualization.

Okay, thanks for the questions. Let’s see how many I can get through.

Socialist Swine, Sexie Sadie, and Kysstfafm: You are correct in noting that desires almost exclusively fulfill or thwart other desires through the actions they cause. It is theoretically possible that a desire can thwart other desires just by existing. However, desires are like black holes. We can never see a desire directly. We can only know of their existence by looking at actions and postulating those desires that best answer the question, “What could have caused a person to act that way?”

What does it mean to have a desire that has no affect on actions? It would be like having a black hole that has no affect on the physical universe. Again, we would have no reason to think it is even there. So, we would have no reason to make any type of assessment.

On this model, a “right act” is that act that a person with good desires would perform. If a person has a bad desire, but he never acts on it, then his actions would still be the actions that a person with good desires would perform. He would never do anything wrong.

Yet, society would still have reason to use its powers of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment to inhibit the formation of that desire generally throughout society. Just because this person does not act on the desire, this does not imply that others would not act on it. It is to save itself from the harms that those others may do that society has reason to inhibit such a desire.

Ulfrekr: If you wanted to light babies on fire, but did not, then we may assume that you had an even stronger (direct or indirect) aversion to lighting babies on fire. Not lighting babies on fire would thwart one of your desires, but lighting babies on fire would thwart even more and stronger desires. Otherwise, you would light babies on fire. You would have no motivating reason strong enough to prevent it.

Kysstfafm and Sexie Sadie: You are correct; one of the properties of a desire is its strength. The stronger a desire, the greater a disposition to act on a desire.

Also, Kysstfafm, you correctly note that a person can be wrong about their desires. They can think that they want something then, when they get it, discover that it does not fulfill a desire of theirs at all. However, the very possibility of making a mistake suggests that there is something there about which a person can be mistaken.

Following Aristotle, there are actually two types of desires—desires as an end, and desires as a means. I can desire a match as a way of lighting a fire so that I can keep warm. My desire for the match is an example of “desires as a means.” My desire for warmth is an example of “desires as an end.”

Of course, some things (e.g., warmth) can be both a means and an end. For example, warmth is not only comforting itself, it can also be useful in preventing frostbite.

Joel Fienberg (Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) defined welfare goods as those things that are universally useful as means. Welfare goods are useful as a means for almost anything one may want as an end. Health is a welfare good, as is money, knowledge, and freedom.

Now, Sexie Sadie, taking all of this into consideration, a desire for a friend’s love and support can outweigh a desire for a car on a number of levels. First, the desire might actually be stronger. Second, the desire for a friends love and support may be augmented by a desire to desire a friend’s love and support. Third, a friend’s love and support might be more useful. Fourth, society in general might have reason to promote a desire for love and support as a way of promoting social cohesion and you, as a part of this society, would then promote this desire as an important social (moral) value.

Kysstfafm: On the realm of fantasy, I can answer this by example. I like to play computer war games. However, a part of my ability to enjoy these games depends on my knowledge that no real people are being made to suffer. A person with a strong aversion to harming others can still engage in fantasy, because a fantasy does not thwart the desire not to harm others. However, society in general has reason to worry that it has no ability to allow a fantasy that does not also make a desire more common as well. Society may have no way of allowing rape fantasies that does not also encourage rape desires. Its interest in inhibiting rape desires gives it reason to inhibit rape fantasies as well. That is to say IF the social institutions of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment cannot distinguish between the two efficiently.